Inside
the School of the Americas: Military pedagogy, drugs, money-laundering
By W.E. GUTMAN
Noriega's
first "no!"
"...The closing of the
Panama-based School of the Americas in 1982 was : mandated as one of the first tangible
changes under the Torrijos-Carter treaties of 1977-78. The United States was well aware of
the provision, but the Reagan administration just couldn't swallow it.
"As determined and proud
as we were to follow through with Torrijos' legacy, the U.S. didn't want any of this to
happen. They wanted an extension or a re-negotiation for the installation, saying that
with their growing war preparations in Central America, they still needed it. But the SOA
was an embarrassment to us. We didn't want a training ground for death squads and
repressive right-wing militaries on our soil.
[Instead] "...we wanted
to convert this international monstrosity for repression and murder into something
completely different. The U.S. was appalled -- they wanted to train demolition teams and
snipers and terrorist squads to fight the Nicaraguan government. I was adamantly opposed.
And this became the first 'NO!' that the U.S. heard me utter -- capped off bymy rejection
of Oliver North's plans for us in Nicaragua...." -- America's Prisoner, by Manuel
Noriega and Peter Eisner. |
The reprieve granted last September by
Congress to the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA)
must be viewed as both symbolic and
premonitory. Having survived its third and narrowest challenge yet -- seven votes short of
seeing its funding slashed and its doors shut down for good -- the SOA, tainted by
heredity and damned by history, may well be on its last leg, a limb further compromised by
nagging rumors that students and faculty alike have allegedly used the base to launder the
ill-gotten profits from narco-trafficking and other federal crimes. With information
obtained by this writer, these rumors could well give fact new life. It could also ring
the death knell for a 50-year old institution which, in a self-serving symbiosis with its
maker, the CIA -- also celebrating its 50th anniversary this year -- has played a sinister
role in Latin America.
Information presented here is based on
depositions gleaned on behalf of an SOA critic whose anonymity will be protected until
public congressional inquiries are convened to examine the weight and veracity of the
testimonies that follow. Minor alterations to the original depositions were made in the
interest of space and clarity.
THE MAJOR
Major Joseph Blair, U.S.
Army, ret--Maj. Blair retired from the U.S. Army in 1989 after 20 years of
service, earning a Bronze Star for valor and five meritorious Service medals. An ROTC
graduate from Marquette University, Blair was commissioned a lieutenant and dispatched to
Vietnam. He was promoted to captain and assigned to general staff as assistant to
then-Deputy Ambassador William F. Colby, the Saigon station chief and later CIA director
(1954-75). After Vietnam, Blair received additional training in logistics at the Army War
College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was promoted to major in 1979 and assigned to NATO
headquarters where he took part in classified operations involving nuclear weapons. Back
in the U.S. Blair earned a master's degree and was sent to Guatemala, where he served as
military attache, then to the U.S. Southern Command at Quarry Heights, Panama. He was then
posted to U.S. Army Infantry headquarters at Fort Benning, Georgia, present site of the
SOA. In 1986, he taught logistics to senior Latin American officers attending the Command
and General Staff Course at the SOA, from which he received the highest possible ratings
in performance reviews by his superiors until his retirement in 1989. As a reserve
officer, Blair was activated for duty during the Gulf War. He also acted as a sponsor and
host to foreign officers visiting the SOA through 1992.
Blair has publicly criticized the SOA in
newspaper articles and op/ed columns since 1993, risking alienation by former colleagues
and friends, and at the cost of some damage to his marriage. [His wife, Rosa, comes from a
well-to-do Guatemalan family. She has been bitterly opposed to his polemic against the
SOA, which has cut her off from friends and relations in Latin America].
In light of his impeccable credentials,
service record and reputation, Blair's accusations, undergirded by his willingness to
accept responsibility for his own role, cannot be easily dismissed.
"...Once it was transferred [from Fort
Gulick, Panama] to Fort Benning, the SOA became the best location in the U.S. for Latin
American military to launder drug money and other funds obtained illegally in their
Countries," says Blair -- an advantage resulting from the conjunction of ready cash,
lax security and local banks eager for business.
The CIA at 50;
a somber legacy
The CIA, like some mythic
deity, has behaved as if it is accountable to no one, as if self-empowerment, when no one
looks, and impunity, when no one cares, are the just entitlements of zealots waging the
good war of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness.
Left to its own devices, it
has time and again justified corrupt means to amoral ends, all in the name of
"national security." Worse, instead of keeping watch against America's real
enemies, it has usurped powers not its own and tried to influence foreign policy.
In defiance of U.S. law,
shielding from public scrutiny like a vampire from the rising sun, it has manipulated
Congress into granting it powers to wage economic warfare, sabotage, subversion and
murder. It further cloaked itself in secrecy by forcing its operatives to sign
irreversible censorship oaths.
It also lied through its
teeth. When the agency engineered the overthrow of the legitimately elected Mohammed
Mossadegh of Iran in 1953, his ouster was reported as a "popular uprising." The
U.S. government did nothing to correct the report. The CIA then shredded all evidence of
its own involvement.
When President Eisenhower
ordered the CIA to foment a coup against the leftist regime of Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz
in 1954, Henry Cabot Lodge, Ike's ambassador to the U.N., rhapsodized the action as a
"revolt of Guatemalans against Guatemalans." Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles (who would order the combined British, French and Israeli forces out of Egypt in
1956 for having acted unilaterally to reopen the Suez Canal without U.S. permission!)
claimed that the Guatemalans were "quietly handling the situation themselves."
Quietly indeed. Over 100,000 dead and over 40,000 "disappeared" make very little
noise.
Four years after Guatemala,
CIA pilots flew missions against Indonesian President Sukarno's forces. The agency then
covertly backed a coup in Chile in 1973 and attempted to murder Fidel Castro and Congolese
head of state, Patrice Lumumba. Castro survived. Lumumba didn't.
In 1984, the U.S. Congress
learned that the CIA, on its own authority, had mined Nicaragua's harbors, thereby
committing a de facto act of war by the United States.
In 1995, the CIA was forced
to admit that it had hired SOA alumnus, Col. Juan Alpirez, the torturer and murdered of
American lawyer Jennifer Harbury's husband, Guatemalan freedom fighter, Efrain Bamaca --
and that it had covered the event for months on end. It also conceded that it had authored
torture manuals. The CIA officer who blew the whistle by informing U.S. Rep. (now Senator)
Robert Torricelli about the incident, was fired.
Torricelli, who leaked the
story to the press, was harshly castigated by members of the House. Some even asked that
he be expelled.
Since 1947, when the
venerable and highly effective OSS was transformed into the present-day CIA, the agency
has hired and sheltered Nazi war criminals and even brought some to work in the United
States. It subsidized and bolstered the regimes of undemocratic but submissive client
states. It bribed publishers, infected scientists and scholars, subverted journalists and
union leaders. And, in blatant violation of law, it snooped on U.S.
citizens, tampered with their
mail, bugged their telephones and tested mind-bending or lethal chemical and biological
agents on unwitting Americans.
It also worked hand-in-glove
with the School of the Americas, its miscegenated twin, in a symbiosis akin to incest that
has spawned unspeakable monsters, some of whom still lurk in our midst, free, unhindered.
-- W.E. Gutman.
|
"Throughout the 1980s students attending
the SOA routinely arrived with large quantities of U.S. cash which did not pass through
any Latin American central banks" [not subject to rigorous scrutiny at U.S. Customs].
"Every day of the week foreign soldiers whose commanding officers earn about $1,000 a
month, entered the U.S. with tens of thousands of dollars stuffed in their pockets,
uniforms, duffel bags." How does Blair know? "Hell, we helped them count the
dough!"
The most egregious case, according to Blair,
was the return of Peruvian Col. Vicente Campodonico in 1992, this time as an instructor.
Records of his attendance in 1992 were destroyed. "He had been a student of mine and
he came back as a guest instructor. I was his host. I picked him up at the airport and
brought him home. He began to stack bundles of cash on my kitchen table and we counted
over $200,000. [Campodonico] said he wanted to buy a restaurant. I gathered he was close
to Peru's former president, Alan Garcia, who was impeached on corruption charges and fled
the country.
"Students received their official
paychecks by mail from their country's attache in Washington. They often handed senior
guest instructors (who acted as purchasing agents) large amounts of cash, along with
shopping lists from their superiors. In social settings, they'd discuss how their fellow
officers enjoyed spending their 'plata de droga.'
"Of course narcotics were only one of
many sources, including extortion, protection rackets, bribes and rake-offs from their own
budgets. Occasionally, one would brag, 'hey, we take ten grand a pop for every plan that
lands.'
"A big part of the attraction to
studying or teaching at the SOA was the opportunity to shop. Visiting officers would get
multiple-entry visas. If they were here five days, they'd spend four shopping. We would
take them on shopping sprees and they'd plunk down cash for cars, stereos, electronic
equipment, appliances, computers, cameras, clothing, toys, jewelry and guns." Guns
were a popular item, says Blair. "The SOA had its own gun dealer on staff -- a
sergeant who got his federal license from the BATF and sold [the students] everything,
including machine guns."
Despite the existence of an elaborate U.S.
banking regulatory structure, "SOA students could walk into any Fort Benning branch
bank and be given a cashier's check to purchase a new car without having to apply for a
loan."
Accompanied by Blair or other field-grade
officers, "students had no problem obtaining a check for 10, 15, even 20,000 dollars
payable to a car dealer, or getting a credit card with a five-, 10-, or 20,000-dollar
limit without a credit report! They were great credit risks: Typical new car loans were
for a period of less than a year. They would buy $20,000 cars and pay them off in a year
or less. Many SOA students bought several cars in a single year!
"Felipe Ochoa, a colonel from Guatemala,
came to the SOA as a student in October 1986. He bought a brand new BMW. A few weeks
later, he claimed it had been stolen, presumably collected the insurance, and bought
another one. He worked under Defense Minister Gen. Hector Gramajo [the notorious architect
of the U.S. funded scorched-earth dirty war against the domestic opposition to the
military dictatorship]. Ochoa was later reassigned to the SOA as an instructor.
"Dominican Lt. Col. Eduardo Tejada, an
SOA instructor from January to August 1987, bought 12 cars in one year. I don't know the
source of his income, or what he did with the cars. But given the relationship between
some elements of the military and drug traffickers, you'd have to be pretty naive not to
suspect that drugs were involved at some point.
"When these guys showed up with big wads
of cash, the banks would run the money through a counting machine that also detected
forgery. Counterfeit currency was commonplace, but identification of such at the banks had
no noticeable effect on Latin American depositors. They did not seem to consider a
counterfeit bill as a personal loss. How much passed into the local [U.S.] economy is
anybody's guess.
"Money laundering was standard operating
procedure at the SOA," Blair affirms. "The banks never questioned the source of
funds. We walked them in, and they just washed it through." SOA students quickly
learned the ropes, according to Blair. "Consequently, they would routinely make
multiple deposits in a single week of between five and nine thousand dollars to avoid a
paper trail of these transactions [limited to $10,000 by the U.S. Treasury Department].
"Given what we know about the ties
between the military and drug traffickers, and given the entrepreneurial ability to turn a
buck -- and their ingenuity in exploiting any perceived openings -- I would not be
surprised if they weren't bringing in coke. It defies the laws of probability that they
weren't and I can't believe that the American officers who commanded the School weren't
aware of the threat. Yet, I never saw any attempt to check visitors' bags or any close
surveillance or security on arrival or departure. It would have been considered
humiliating, an insult."
An incident recounted by Blair -- the death
of Lt. Col. Julio Rivera -- raises particular concerns about the manipulation of SOA
records and the role U.S. military may have played in aiding and abetting in a flourishing
drug trade. "Rivera had been in charge of logistics support for SOA students in the
later 1980s." [SOA documents list a Major. Pedro Rivera, Director of Evaluation under
then Commandant Jose Feliciano, in 1993]. "A fellow retired officer called me in the
spring of 1994 to say that Rivera had been caught dealing cocaine in El Salvador, where he
was stationed as an advisor to the Salvadoran Army. When arrested, Rivera allegedly pulled
the pin on a hand grenade and died in the conflagration. If true," Blair maintains,
"the story raises the possibility that U.S. officers may have collaborated in
narcotrafficking schemes with the very forces they were supposed to train in drug
interdiction.
THE SERGEANT
Sgt. Major Guy Wayne Strickland,
U.S. Army, ret.--Wayne Strickland served 20 years in the U.S. Army, retiring
in 1992 with the rank of sergeant major after the Gulf War, where he served with an
armored brigade. Earlier, he served in Vietnam, Europe and Panama. He taught land warfare
weapons and tactics courses at the SOA from 1984 to 1992.
Strickland confirmed Blair's account of the
routine processing of Latin American troops without the inconvenience of a U.S. Customs
check. "We'd get the call to go to the airport with a bunch of trucks. They'd file
off a C-140 Starlifter, and we'd walk 'em through the hangar to the other side, and they'd
get on buses. Our own men would load their bags on trucks. We'd take'em to the barracks
and drop off their gear. They could have been carrying anything."
Strickland also confirmed that low-salaried
non-com students would routinely spend thousands of dollars at a clip on used as well as
late model cars. "Sometimes we'd let them loose at the shopping mall, and we'd have
to help them carry their goodies."
Strickland's wife, Brenda, operations manager
for Rhodes Furniture store in Columbus, Georgia, says she had witnessed strange spending
patterns. "High-ranking officers would bring in all these credit applications, which
were summarily approved even though they had no credit history -- supposedly because our
government guarantees that they can't leave the country without paying their bills. They
liked the idea of putting a third down with no interest for six months. This was not cheap
furniture; only the best. And these weren't small purchases; they'd buy six, seven, ten
thousand dollars worth. We'd deliver the merchandise to their houses and when they were
ready to leave, we'd help them pack and ship it home. They always paid off their balance
-- who knows how."
According to Strickland, the salesman SOA
students preferred was "invariably" Miguel Smith, son-in-law of Col. Miguel
Garcia, one of the commandants at the SOA. This arrangement suggests the high probability
that U.S. military personnel or their relatives directly benefitted from the apparent lack
of interest in the source of large amounts of cash held by their students and guest
instructors.
Click on the image to see a
magnified version of a
de-classified document:
THE JOURNALIST
Billy Winn, Editor, Editorial
Page, Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Columbus, Georgia. -- Owned by the R. W. Page
Corp, a subsidiary of the Knight-Ridder chain since 1974, the Ledger-Enquirer has
traditionally supported the military, and more specifically the SOA which it served as an
unofficial voice. But the paper's defense of the SOA has cooled over the years,
particularly in light of some of its alumni's involvement in horrific human rights abuses,
and especially since the takeover by John Greenman as publisher. Winn has since run
several opinion pieces by Blair, and has written his own series, including a critique of
the SOA. According to Winn, Greenman has indicated that a drug scandal would tip the
scales of his paper against the SOA.
No time for colonels
Three Honduran Army
colonels, two of them retired, were recently implicated in get-rich-quick schemes
involving the fraudulent handling of government assets. One of them, Col. Roberto Nunez
Montes (ret.) was the subject of the first and only interview with an SOA graduate (HTW,
November 23, 1996). Nunez, a former military intelligence chief (G2) and the ex-director
of Honduras' telecommunications company, Hondutel, was cited by an America's Watch report
as the alleged mastermind of a raid, in 1987, on the household of an alternate Honduran
congressional deputy.
Col. Victor Anael Castillo
Suazo (ret.) managed the armory under Chief of Staff Luis Alonzo Discua Elvir, an SOA
alumnus allegedly involved in horrific acts of brutality. Col. Alberto Zelaya Estrada,
still in active service, heads the Instituto de Prevision Militar.
All three were accused of
misappropriating funds and of displaying wealth well out of proportion with their salaries
and pensions.
None is expected to stand
trial. -- W. E. Gutman |
Winn acknowledges his paper's qualified
support for the SOA. He also admits that Columbus, a city of 250,000, has long had a drug
problem associated with Fort Benning, home of the SOA, where over 20,000 troops are
stationed. "I'm not aware of any systematic investigation by military or civilian law
enforcement authorities of possible money laundering or narcotrafficking by foreign
students and instructors at the SOA." When apprised of Blair's allegations in April,
Winn said: Maybe that's something we should look into. I'll talk to some people and see
what I can unearth. If Winn has "unearthed" anything, he's not telling.
THE FBI AGENT
Thomas M. Class, Sr., Special Agent,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Blair is on record as having faced Class with
allegations of drug-running and money laundering at the SOA. Class refused to be
interviewed. "Any FBI agent who talks to the press without authorization about an
investigation ought to be fired," he said. When asked if this meant that an
investigation was in fact taking place, he replied," I'll neither confirm nor deny
any investigation -- nor that I have ever talked to Major Blair or anyone else."
THE BASE COMMANDANT
Col. Roy Trumble, Commandant, SOA
Using a "pending Department of
Defense investigation" as an excuse, Trumble and public affairs officer, Capt. Kevin
McIver, declined to issue any formal statement. When asked what was under investigation,
McIver replied," I can't say but it's a bunch of old s***."
Trumble and McIver also declined to
supply a current budget, staff roster, or curriculum and course description, citing the
investigation. They referred all questions about the SOA to the School's home-page
<http://home.fia.net/~soa.>.
Predictably, the SOA, which
has trained, supplied and coddled the "internal security" forces of 17 Latin
American and Caribbean nations -- and whose alumni continue to bask in the benevolent glow
of immunity -- has so far evaded a fatal in vivo dissection. The world -- and U.S.
taxpayers who have been footing the bill for the past 50 years -- may have to wait for an
actual post-mortem to view and get a full whiff of the SOA's malodorous entrails.
W. E. Gutman is a Connecticut-based
investigative journalist and a frequent contributor to Honduras This Week. |